This book shows otherwise. John Martin rehabilitates Neoplatonism, founded by Plotinus and brought into Christianity by St. Augustine.

Reviewed Works:Andrew Hodges, Rolf Herken, Alan Turing and the Turing Machine.Stephen C. Kleene, Turing's Analysis of Computability, and Major Applications of it.Robin Gandy, The Confluence of Ideas in 1936.Solomon Feferman, Turing in the Land of O.Martin Davis, Esther R. Phillips, Mathematical Logic and the Origin of Modern Computers.

While Saint Augustine has been a household name for centuries, the same cannot be said of long-overlooked philosopher John Poinsot. But in _Augustine and Poinsot_, John Deely contends that the history of semiotics cannot be conceived of without Poinsot’s landmark contribution. According to Deely, even though Augustine was the first to describe _what_ the sign does, Poinsot was the first to show _how_ the sign mediates between nature and culture. This revolutionary volume demonstrates how Poinsot’s account of semiotics (...) allows us to produce human knowledge and experience. (shrink)

'An impressive synthesis of semiotics and anthropology which puts human experience in a new light. Deely gives us the foundation for a new paradigm for anthropology.' -Nathan Houser, Peirce Edition Project.

Realism for the 21st Century is a collection of thirty essays from John Deely—a major figure in contemporary semiotics and an authority on scholastic realism and the works of Charles Sanders Peirce. The volume tracks Deely's development as a pragmatic realist, featuring his early essays on our relation to the world after Darwinism; crucial articles on logic, semiotics, and objectivity; overviews of philosophy after modernity; and a new essay on “purely objective reality.”.

Cenoscopy and ideoscopy -- The turn to ideoscopy -- Nothing is certain -- The way of ideas -- Nominalism versus realism -- The interplay of objects in thought and things in the world -- Sensation cenoscopically considered -- The semiotics of sensation -- The semiosic structure of the sensory manifold -- Semiopsis beyond perception -- Descartes and Poinsot : retrospect and prospect.

We present Backward Clock, an original counterexample to Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking analysis of propositional knowledge, which works differently from other putative counterexamples and avoids objections to which they are vulnerable. We then argue that four ways of analysing knowledge in terms of safety, including Duncan Pritchard’s, cannot withstand Backward Clock either.

The article is an extended review of the The Deacon Reader. The fourteen papers in this volume address historical, theological, pastoral and spiritual aspects of the modern Roman Catholic diaconate as developed in the United States. These papers are of mixed quality, and also illustrate the difficulties which supporters of the diaconate experience in developing a coherent theology and praxis of the diaconate. In contrast with several recent major Anglican and Lutheran approaches to the diaconate, these North American reflections have (...) yet to come to terms with the implications for the diaconate of the new linguistic profile of diakonia provided by the reviewer’s 1990 study Diakonia: Re-interpreting the Ancient Sources. (shrink)

Studies of testosterone's effect on dominance are confounded by the effects of dominance experiences on testosterone. Furthermore, antisocial behavior tends to originate prepubertally, when testosterone levels are the same for aggressive males, nonaggressive males, and females. It seems more parsimonious to view variation in testosterone as an effect of dominance-related mood states than to invoke a reciprocal model.

The paper presents a brief survey of recent work by Metakides, Nerode and others in the area of effective algebra and makes some comments on the relation between formal presentations, characterizations, etc. of sets and of algebraic structures and their practical presentations.

Suppose that someone wishes to characterize God as the independent, the creature as the totally dependent. Or suppose that someone wishes to work out in general the implications of the independent vis-à-vis the totally dependent. I take total dependence to entail that B is dependent upon A, but that A is independent of B, that B is dependent on nothing else than A, and that there is nothing in B which is independent of A. Are there other logical patterns which (...) are legitimate renderings of, or at least compatible with, independence: total dependence? (shrink)

Suppose that someone wishes to characterize God as the independent, the creature as the totally dependent. Or suppose that someone wishes to work out in general the implications of the independent vis-à-vis the totally dependent. I take total dependence to entail that B is dependent upon A, but that A is independent of B, that B is dependent on nothing else than A, and that there is nothing in B which is independent of A. Are there other logical patterns which (...) are legitimate renderings of, or at least compatible with, independence: total dependence? (shrink)

We explore psychological contracts as mechanisms by which individuals gain influence in organizations. Using two distinct research settings and longitudinal analysis, we demonstrate that ideological contracts endow individuals with increased centrality in the organization’s influence network. More generally, we propose that an important outcome of different psychological contract types may be how they affect the nature of influence in organizations.

John N Andrews; General Thinking Skills: are there such things?, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 71–79, https://doi.o.

This paper is roughly in two parts. The first deals with whether know-how is constituted by propositional knowledge, as discussed primarily by Gilbert Ryle (1949) The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing how. Journal of Philosophy, 98, pp. 411–444 as well as Stephen Hetherington (2006). How to know that knowledge-that is knowledge-how. In S. Hetherington (Ed.) Epistemology futures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The conclusion of this first part is that know-how sometimes does and sometimes (...) does not consist in propositional knowledge. The second part defends an analysis of know-how inspired by Katherine Hawley’ (2003). Success and knowledge-how. American Philosophical Quarterly, 40, pp. 19–31, insightful proposal that know-how requires counterfactual success. I conclude by showing how this analysis helps to explain why know-how sometimes does and sometimes does not consist of propositional knowledge. (shrink)

I supply an argument for Evans's principle that whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I believe that p. I show how this principle helps explain how I come to know my own beliefs in a way that normally makes me the best authority on them. Then I show how the principle helps to solve Moore's paradoxes.

It is raining but you don’t believe that it is raining. Imagine accepting this claim. Then you are committed to saying ‘It is raining but I don’t believe that it is raining’. This would be an ‘absurd’ thing to claim or assert, yet what you say might be true. It might be raining, while at the same time, you are completely ignorant of the state of the weather. But how can it be absurd of you to assert something about yourself (...) that might be true of you? This is Moore’s paradox as it occurs in speech. What is the source of the absurdity? And why does it strike us that a contradiction is somehow at work when there is no contradiction in the content of what is asserted? In Section 2, I describe Moore’s formulation of the paradox and evaluate his own solutions. In Section 3, I discuss Wittgenstein’s inf luence in solving the paradox. In Section 4, I discuss Shoemaker’s priority thesis that once the absurdity in belief has been explained, then this will translate into an explanation of the absurdity in assertion. In Section 5, I discuss work on omissive and commissive Moore-paradoxical assertions, i.e. those of the forms p & I don’t believe that p and p & I believe that not-p. In Section 6, I discuss work on assertions of the form p & I don’t know that p. (shrink)